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CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY, EXECUTIVES' PET CHARITIES 
AND THE AGENCY PROBLEM 
JAYNE W. BARNARD. 
Historically, charitable contributions often depended on the 
personal interests of the chief executive officer. Today the 
corporate culture is being redefined. 1 
Once considered the whim of CEOs-or of their 
spouses-corporate giving these days is often a standard business 
expense for which results must be shown. 2 
In [the 1950s], the chief executive officer played an exaggerated 
role. He might identify a pet cause, one that had little or no 
connection to the core activities of the business, and proceed to 
commit the corporation to donating relatively large sums of 
money .... [Today], a [new] stage in corporate giving has 
emerged. This stage has been labelled strategic philanthropy. 
Strategic philanthropy attempts to link charitable giving to 
financial performance. 3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate philanthropy in the mid-1990s is said to be governed by 
strict criteria, implemented by professionals who demand accountability 
from the donees, and evaluated in terms of stated corporate objectives. It 
is strategic, cost-conscious, and "'Janus-faced'-one face serving the 
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary School of Law. 
Some of the thoughts in this paper originated in my Seminar in Corporate Governance. 
I am grateful to my students for discussing the issues surrounding corporate philanthropy 
with me. Thanks also to Glenn Coven, Toni Robinson, and Steve Bainbridge, who read 
earlier drafts of this commentary and whose comments and insights helped to make it 
more coherent. Lawrence Lederman and Alemante Selassie also made good suggestions. 
Most of all, thanks to Faith Kahn and the editors and members of the New York Law 
School Law Review for putting together this exciting symposium on a complex and 
interesting subject. 
1. DIANE J. GINGOLD & ELIZABETH A.C. WElL, THE CORPORATE PATRON 13 
(1991). 
2. P.J. Corkery, What's in It for Me? Self-interest Is Guiding the Corporate 
Handouts of Today-Leaving Some Worthy Causes Out in the Cold, Bus. MONTHLY, 
Nov. 1, 1989, at 46, 47. 
3. MOSES L. PAVA & JOSHUA KRAUSZ, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL COST 115-16 (1995). 
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community, the other serving [the corporation's] business units. "4 The 
whims or "pet projects" of highly-placed executives no longer drive 
corporate charitable contributions as they once did.5 
This scenario, though perhaps appealing, is a myth in many public 
companies. As has been the case throughout American history, corporate 
philanthropy today is often driven by the personal preferences of highly-
placed executives. Executives' "pet projects" have not disappeared. To 
the contrary, subsidized "pet projects" are thriving in the arts, in 
education, in the environment, and in various programs for the indigent. 
This commentary examines the phenomenon of "pet charity" funding 
by public companies. Without questioning that the corporate giving 
function in many corporations has become institutionalized in the last 
fifteen years, complete with grant-giving guidelines, standardized 
application procedures, glossy public reports of corporate giving and 
sophisticated "cause-related marketing" strategies, this commentary 
challenges the notion that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) no longer 
influence corporate giving in significant and sometimes very personal 
ways. 
Indeed, this commentary will explore several recent situations in which 
a corporation's CEO allocated corporate funds toward charitable activities 
that may fairly be placed in the "pet charity" category or at the very least 
cannot reasonably be assigned to the category of strategic philanthropy. 
There are many examples of such behavior, some of them captured in 
4. Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 
1994, at 105, 108. 
5. The significance of the terms "pet project" and "pet charity" derives from the 
leading case addressing the propriety of corporate charitable contributions, A. P. Smith 
Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953). 
In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved a corporate contribution to Prince-
ton University where there was "no suggestion that it was made indiscriminately or to a 
pet charity of the corporate directors in furtherance of personal rather than corporate 
ends." !d. at 590. Accordingly, the contribution was found to be valid under both 
common and statutory law. See id. 
One might question the conclusion that there was no "pet charity" involved in the 
Barlow case considering that the then-president of A.P. Smith, Hubert F. O'Brien, was 
an alumnus of Princeton, class of 1931. Telephone Interview with Mary Terrell, 
Princeton Alumni Council (Sept. 9, 1996). Regardless, the suggestion that gifts to "pet 
charities" might be inappropriate was challenged in a later decision: 
And while the court [in Barlow] pointed out that there was no showing that the 
gift in question was made indiscriminately or to a pet charity ... , the actual 
holding of the opinion appears to be that a corporate charitable or educational 
gift to be valid must merely be within reasonable limits both as to amount and 
purpose. 
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
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best-selling business books, journalistic exposes, and even some judicial 
opinions. 
These examples serve as a reminder that corporate CEOs have often 
used their corporations' resources as if those resources were their own, 
and sometimes for very rational reasons. These CEOs have spent their 
shareholders' money on projects that offered little, if any, benefit to the 
corporation while providing substantial benefits to the CEOs in the form 
of psychic satisfaction, increased status, and visibility in the community 
of leaders in which they travel or to which they aspire. 6 Occasionally, 
these executives have "matched" their corporate contributions with 
personal contributions; more often, however, they have not, finding the 
use of their corporation's resources to be an adequate expression of their 
charitable intent. 7 
This behavior, which in other contexts might amount to 
misappropriation, has long been thought to be acceptable, primarily 
because the benefitted charities have been "qualified" and are therefore 
worthy to receive corporate gifts, and because the gifts themselves have 
typically been immaterial, in an accounting sense, to the corporation. 8 
Little critical attention has been paid to this behavior, probably because 
progressives have viewed corporate philanthropy as desirable, regardless 
of its origins, and managerialists have viewed corporate philanthropy as 
a legitimate perquisite of leadership. 
6. See generally infra Section IV. There are several reasons why a CEO may choose 
to orchestrate corporate charitable contributions: to enhance her personal prestige in her 
local community; to elevate her reputation as one who can make things happen; to re-
ciprocate for earlier contributions made by business colleagues to other projects with 
which she is associated; or simply because, within her own belief system, a particular 
organization is a good, socially valuable organization to support. 
7. Warren Buffett tells the story of an acquaintance who solicits funds from corporate 
leaders: 
[l]t's rather interesting, in the last five years he's raised 8 million dollars. He's 
raised it from 60 corporations. It almost never fails .... And in the process 
of raising this 8 million dollars from 60 corporations from people who nod and 
say that it's a marvelous idea, its pro-social, etc., not one CEO has reached in 
his pocket and pulled out 10 bucks of his own to give to this marvelous charity. 
They've given 8 million dollars collectively of other people's money. And so 
far he's yet to get his first 10-dollar bill. 
JOHN COFFEE ET AL., KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE 
TAKEOVER 14 (1988). 
8. See Usha C.V. Haley, Corporate Contributions as Managerial Masques: 
Reframing Corporate Contributions as Strategies to Influence Society, 28 J. MGMT. 
STUD. 486, 503 (1991) ("[m]anagerial discretion over contributions may exist because 
contributions form such small percentages of corporate incomes."). 
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There are several ways, however, to approach those giving situations 
in which conflicts of interest are apparent: (1) one could ignore them on 
the theory that other corporate governance issues of arguably greater 
magnitude are more deserving of attention and legal reform; (2) one could 
prohibit these situations from occurring either by completely outlawing 
corporate charitable contributions or by outlawing corporate charitable 
contributions with a conflict of interest "profile"; (3) one could treat these 
contributions as taxable income to the CEO or disallow the corporation's 
deductions for such contributions; (4) one could, as Professor Kahn 
suggests,9 require that these and all charitable expenditures be disclosed 
under the federal securities laws; and (5) one could insist that such 
expenditures regularly be considered by the board of directors as part of 
an overall package that takes into account both executive compensation 
practices and corporate charitable objectives. 
In this commentary, I will explore and reject the first three 
approaches, endorse a version of the fourth and argue in favor of the fifth. 
Before doing so, however, I will recapitulate the history of CEO 
involvement in corporate charitable contributions and examine some of the 
more notorious examples of CEOs who have commandeered the corporate 
charitable function. I will also examine some of the reasons why CEOs 
find corporate philanthropy such an alluring arena in which to exercise 
their power. 
II. THE FivE STAGES OF MODERN CORPORATE GIVING 
AND THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
A. From Unilateral Decisions to Complex Organization 
From 1935, when Congress first granted a tax deduction for corporate 
charitable contributions, 10 until the mid-1970s, most corporate philanthropy 
was modest, informal, idiosyncratic, and characterized largely by localized 
expenditures. 11 Charitable allocations were typically driven by a 
company's chief executive officer, who unilaterally determined the objects 
of his corporation's philanthropic efforts, the amount to be devoted to 
9. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the 
Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REv. 579, 586 (1997). 
10. See Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014 (adding subsection 
(r) to section 23 of the Revenue Act of 1934, thereby allowing a corporation to deduct 
charitable contributions to the extent of five percent of its income). 
11. See generally ERNEST W. LEFEVER ET AL., SCHOLARS, DOLLARS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 14-15 (1983); Peter Dobkin Hall, Business Giving and Social Investment in the 
United States, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 221-45 
(Richard Magat ed., 1989). 
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particular projects, and the manner (if at all) in which the gifts would be 
monitored. 12 A corporation's charitable activity was often a measure of 
the CEO's power in his company as well as his status in the community. 
Thus, in stage one, or the "benevolent despot" stage of corporate 
philanthropy, the chief executive officer was unquestionably the key to 
corporate giving; little, if any, attention was given to the profit 
expectations or giving preferences of shareholders. 
A significant transformation in corporate philanthropy occurred during 
the Watergate era: 
Prior to [this period], many managers had adhered to a philosophy 
that stressed "sticking to business" and avoiding the media, but 
during the 1970s a managerial culture emerged that, by contrast, 
emphasized outreach and openness. Fearing increasing political 
isolation in a period of public disenchantment with established 
institutions, major corporations enlarged their public affairs 
operations, by opening Washington offices, creating political 
action committees, encouraging their managers to participate in 
community affairs and, not least, expanding their giving 
budgets. 13 
During this second, or "public citizen," stage of corporate 
philanthropy, decisions relating to charitable giving continued to reside in 
the highest precincts of the corporation and typically reflected the social 
and political values of the CEO. Some corporate leaders, like William C. 
Norris of Control Data Corporation, committed their companies to very 
ambitious visions of social change, often to the dismay of their 
subordinates. 14 Other CEOs were less visible, though many inched their 
12. An example of this type of CEO-driven philanthropy is David Rockefeller's 
creation at the Chase Manhattan Bank of a "corporate art" program in the late 1950s. 
Rockefeller, whose family had founded the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, 
put together a program by which Chase would purchase paintings, display them at bank 
offices around the world, then donate them (claiming appreciated valuations) to various 
art museums. See WILLIAM HOFFMAN, DAVID 84 (1971). 
13. Michael Useem, Corporate Support for Culture and the Arts, in THE COST OF 
CULTURE: PATTERNS AND PROSPECTS OF PRIVATE ARTS PATRONAGE 45, 45 (Margaret 
Jane Wyzomirski & Pat Clubb eds., 1989) [hereinafter Useem, Corporate Support]. 
14. See JAMES C. WORTHY, WILLIAM C. NORRIS: PORTRAIT OF A MAVERICK 
(1987). Under Norris's direction, Control Data became a national leader in siting 
factories in urban ghettoes. Moreover, at Norris's insistence, these plants were staffed 
largely by the so-called "hard-core unemployed" who lived in nearby neighborhoods. 
With force of will and painstaking management, these factories became efficient and, 
ultimately, successful. Norris became a critic of traditional corporate philanthropy, 
noting: 
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companies towards a more socially responsible profile. 15 "In most cases, 
these gestures were responses to public demand or expressions of well-
intentioned executives[' desire] to 'do good.'" 16 In either case, the 
selection of a charitable agenda was typically dominated by the corporate 
chief executive or other high-level corporate officers. 17 As in the 
"benevolent despot" stage of corporate philanthropy, little thought was 
given to the profit expectations or the charitable preferences of 
shareholders. 18 l 
Then came the third, or "technocratic," stage of corporate 
philanthropy, characterized by the professionalization of the giving 
process. Rather than distributing corporate charitable ftifts from the 
executive suite or "out of the back pocket of the CEO," 9 corporations 
began designating professional gift managers to establish gift criteria and 
priorities, provide order and consistency in recordkeeping, develop 
ongoing ties with charitable recipients and report on the impact of the 
corporation's philanthropic program. As one observ:er noted in 1981, 
"You look at the reports (of corporate and other foundations] and, hell, there 
are hundreds of little projects, $10,000 here and $5,000 there, and what have 
they got to show for it? You can see, they're really not accomplishing very 
much." Philanthropy [like this] "makes the boss feel like a white knight for 
a little while," [but these kinds of projects are] "peripheral to real problems . 
" 
!d. at 132. 
15. For example, following the Detroit riots of 1967, and at the request of the mayor 
and the governor, Henry Ford II announced the creation of 6,500 new jobs, five thousand 
of which would be filled by ghetto residents. "Written job tests were dispensed with, and 
special buses were put into service to ferry the new labor force to the plants." WALTER 
HAYES, HENRY: A LIFE OF HENRY FORD II 52 (1990). 
16. Hall, supra note 11, at 237. 
17. In a study conducted from 1980 to 1981 of 229 large companies, researchers 
found that the primary policy setter for corporate contributions was either a committee 
of senior executives (27.5% of respondents) or the CEO (22.7% of respondents). See 
John J. Siegfried et al., The Management of Corporate Contributions, in 5 REsEARCH IN 
CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY: A REsEARCH ANNUAL 87, 92 (Lee E. 
Preston ed., 1983). Other sources of policy setting included the board of directors 
(17.9% of respondents) and the chairman of the board (10.9%). See id. 
18. It is fair to say that the rhetoric accompanying many of these charitable projects 
suggested otherwise. Decisions to open factories in urban ghettos, for example, were 
often justified by the need to "create new markets." 
19. Siegfried et al., supra note 17, at 97 (describing the method that some companies 
in his study used to determine to whom corporate charitable contributions would be 
made). 
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Giving . . . is now seen by most corporations as a matter of 
corporate policy, requiring a rational and systematic process of 
review by someone held responsible and accountable for the 
action taken. Many corporations now have highly qualified 
managers to administer contributions . . . a situation that differs 
vastly from that existing at the beginning of the [1970s].20 
During this stage, corporations began to be seen as moving toward a 
"more market-driven strategic management, bottom-line approach to 
philanthropy. "21 Even during this third stage, however, corporate 
charitable giving was often more reactive than proactive.22 Corporations 
for the most part still responded to grant requests from unrelated nonprofit 
organizations, rather than shaping a process that uniquely identified a 
corporate philanthropic agenda. 
Throughout this period, a growing number of corporations established 
separate charitable foundations through which to channel their giving. 
These foundations permitted a company to even out the "peaks and 
valleys" in contributions resulting from swings in corporate profits,23 and 
allowed a corporation to maximize the impact of corporate gifts.24 A few 
foundations were specifically designed to insulate the giving process from 
the influences of the CE0.25 Studies show, however, that "[w]ith very 
few exceptions, foundation boards [were] composed entirely of company 
officers and management, and for practical purposes, there was no 
distinction between the giving programs of the corporations themselves and 
20. 2 AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR THE ARTS, CORPORATE GIVING IN THE ARTS 3 
(Robert A. Porter ed., 1981). 
21. Timothy S. Mescon & Donn J. Tilson, Corporate Philanthropy: A Strategic 
Approach to the Bottom-Line, 29 CAL. MGMT. REv. 49, 49 (1987). 
22. See E.B. Knauft, The Management of Corporate Giving Programs, in 
PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 261, 265 (Richard Magat 
ed., 1989). 
23. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS IN SMALLER 
COMPANIES 4 (1973) (describing how companies utilize this mechanism). 
24. See Benjamin T. White, Consequences of Corporate Giving, TR. & EsT., Aug. 
1987, at 35, 35 ("The immediate deductibility of gifts to the foundation means that in 
good years a corporation can 'endow' its foundation, and, as the earnings of that 
endowment build up, use those earnings to supplement the grants made possible by the 
company's annual contribution to the foundation."); see also CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, 
FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 185 (1985) ("Contributions from a 
corporation to its foundation are deductible like other contributions and are subject to the 
percentage ceiling, but grants made by foundations are not subject to the ceiling."). 
25. See Siegfried et al., supra note 17, at 92 (stating that "19 firms [out of 229] 
reported that a major purpose of their corporate foundation is to foster autonomous 
decisions in allocating contributions"). 
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the giving programs of corporate foundations. "26 Consequently, as in the 
first and second stages of modern corporate philanthropy, corporate top 
executives maintained tight control over their companies' charitable giving 
programs. Shareholders' economic concerns were largely disregarded. 27 
The fourth, or "decade of greed," stage of corporate giving emerged 
in the mid-1980s, as corporations began to conflate philanthropy with their 
marketing strategies. Increasingly, corporate giving was calculated to 
promote a particular corporate image, or to stimulate sales. By 1991, for 
example, "[t]he funds raised by the National Gallery's office of corporate 
relations ... most often [came] from marketing, public relations, and 
advertising budgets, not corporate foundations. "28 "Cause-related 
marketing," conceived by American Express in 1983 when it (very 
publicly) promised to make a penny contribution to the Statue of Liberty 
restoration effort for every use of an American Express credit card, was 
embraced by many other American companies to the point that, for some, 
the marketing of the giving campaign to the public cost man1 times the 
amount actually given as a corporate charitable contribution.2 By 1990, 
the use of cause-related marketin~ techniques was increasing by between 
ten and fifteen percent annually. 3 
26. Knauft, supra note 22, at 266. 
27. Shareholders' social concerns, on the other hand, became a preoccupying issue 
for many companies. The 1970s saw a dramatic rise in the submission of shareholder 
social proposals and labor and church organizations began orchestrating high-visibility 
proxy campaigns. See, e.g., Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: 
Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1971) (describing this grass-roots 
effort). 
28. GINGOLD & WElL, supra note 1, at 13. 
29. For example, the Coors Brewing Company's "Literacy, Pass it On" program 
has been described as a $40 million effort. Of that amount, only a small percent 
represents a direct contribution to national, regional and local literacy organizations 
providing direct client services. The balance has been spent on an "extensive public 
awareness effort. The multimedia component of the program entails newspaper, 
magazine, radio and billboard advertising, as well as direct marketing to promote 
solutions to illiteracy. Other program components include advertising and public relations 
programs targeted to the general market, African-Americans, Hispanics, and women." 
L. LAWRENCE EMBLEY, DOING WELL WHILE DOING GOOD: THE MARKETING LINK 
BETWEEN BUSINESS AND NONPROFIT CAUSES 178 (1993). 
In American Express's case, the company ultimately made a $1.7 million 
contribution to the Statue of Liberty Foundation. The number of new cardholders 
increased 45 percent during the promotion period and American Express also noted higher 
than usual card usage. This, said a spokesman, proved that "helping others also can be 
good business." Useem, Corporate Support,. supra note 13, at 50. 
30. See Corporate Giving: Who Spends Most, and for What?, ACROSS THE BOARD, 
May 1990, at 30, 33. 
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During this period, it became more common for corporate gift 
managers to factor in the publicity value of a given gift, along with the 
merits of the beneficiary's request, when assessing whether to make a 
charitable contribution. 31 Non-profits aggressively cultivated this 
mentality32 and many mutually beneficial projects resulted. 33 Corporations 
themselves sought out projects that offered a quid pro quo. 34 In short, by 
stage four, corporate giving had become "more than a passive product of 
business success. It [was now] used to stimulate income as well. "35 
For the first time in history, the economic concerns of shareholders 
appeared to be playing a significant role in corporations' philanthropic 
decision-making. In the crassest possible way, notions of profit 
maximization had at last begun to make their way into the philanthropic 
equation. Significantly, many of the gifts that resulted were characterized 
for tax purposes as "ordinary and necessary business expenses" rather than 
31. See Michael Useem, Trends and Preferences in Corporate Support for the Arts, 
in 4 AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR THE ARTS, CORPORATE GIVING IN THE ARTS ix, xiii 
(Robert A. Porter ed., 1987) (reporting that surveyed companies increased the attention 
given to a gift's "publicity value" between a survey conducted in 1979 and a second 
survey conducted in 1986) [hereinafter Useem, Trends]. 
32. New York's Metropolitan Museum, for example, circulated a prospectus to 
business leaders trumpeting the rewards of sponsoring an art exhibition: "Many public 
relations opportunities are available through sponsorship of outstanding special exhibitions 
at the [Met] .... Learn how you can provide creative and cost effective answers to your 
marketing objectives by identifying your corporate names with Vincent Van Gogh ... 
Canaletto . . . Remington, Fragonard, Rembrandt or Goya . . . . " NICHOLAS VON 
HOFFMAN, CAPITALIST FOOLS: TALES OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, FROM CARNEGIE TO 
FORBES TO THE MILKEN GANG 166 (1992). 
33. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, The Metropolitan's Notori-ous Display, Bus. WK., 
Apr. 5, 1993, at 64 (describing a costume show at the Metropolitan Museum, sponsored 
by a lingerie designer. "For less than the cost of staging a runway fashion show, Natori 
links up with a high-profile exhibition of 80 mannequins dressed in designs by the likes 
of Valentino, Balenciaga, Fortuny, and Gaultier-as well as four of her own. The Met 
predicts that 250,000 visitors will see the show before it closes on Aug. 15. "); What's 
in a Name? Art and Food, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at C2 (describing how the 
Metropolitan Museum "wooed" Goya Foods Inc., a manufacturer of Hispanic foods, and 
secured funding for the museum's elaborate exhibition of 300 works by Francisco de 
Goya). 
34. See Pamela Sebastian, Attaching Strings: With Coffers Less Full, Big 
Companies Alter Their Gifts to Charities, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 26, 1993, at AI 
(describing a program by Chrysler Corporation to make donations to popular museums 
that would agree to exhibit their new model cars). 
35. Useem, Corporate Support, supra note 13, at 48. 
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"charitable gifts. "36 These expenditures-often substantial ones-thus 
began disappearing from statistics measuring corporate charitable 
contributions. "Real" corporate philanthropy began to decline.37 
Today, corporate philanthropy has entered the fifth, or "strategic 
retrenchment," stage. In-kind gifts and release time programs for 
corporate employees38 have been increasing. 39 Furthermore, the overall 
value of corporate giving, exclusive of cause-related marketing efforts, 
increased in 1995 to over seven billion dollars.40 
The format of today's corporate giving is quite different than it was 
during earlier stages of corporate philanthropy. Corporate giving in 1996 
no longer reflects an undisciplined, "smorgasbord" approach to charitable 
contributions; rather, it reflects a more selective, long-term investment-
type approach to non-profit organizations.41 "Community partnerships" 
are being developed42 and collaborative alliances are being formed between 
corporations and their favored charities, or corporations and governmental 
36. Payments made by a corporation to a non-profit organization may be treated as 
an ordinary and necessary business expense when the company has an expectation of . 
financial return from the gift. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-09-006 (Mar. 5, 1993) (supermarket's · 
donation of one percent of its revenue to local charities, following an extensive 
advertising campaign in which the charities' names were prominently featured, may be 
treated as a business expense rather than a charitable gift). See also Rev. Rul. 72-314, 
1972-1 C.B. 44; Rev. Rul. 63-73, 1963-1 C.B. 35; Robert E. Harrison, Payments to 
Charities by Business Enterprises: Sec. 162 v. Sec. 170, TAX ADVISOR, Aug. 1995, at 
473. 
37. See AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 1995: THE ANNUAL 
REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1994, at 76 (1995) (noting that corporate 
giving in inflation-adjusted dollars fell each year from 1987 to 1994). 
38. See Marcia Vickers, Keeping Valued Employees by Letting Them Go, for a 
While, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at Fll (describing such programs). 
39. See Paul Sweeney, Corporate Giving Goes Creative, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
1994, § 3 (Business), at 6. 
40. See William H. Miller, Citizenship That's Hard to Ignore, INDUSTRY WK., Sept. 
2, 1996, at 21. 
41. See Lois Therrien, Corporate Generosity is Greatly Depreciated, Bus. WK., 
Nov. 2, 1992, at 118. 
42. A community partnership is a close relationship between a company 
and a not-for-profit institution, in which the company agrees to 
contribute human and financial resources to the development of the 
institution on terms acceptable to both, so that the institution can 
produce better results for society. In return, the institution might 
agree to work with the company to enhance its public image or to 
cooperate with the marketing of its products in ways which will not 
compromise the integrity of either the company or the institution. 
Everald Compton, Community Partnerships, 48 IPA REv. 42, 42 (1996). 
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agencies, and they are working together toward achievable ends.43 
Corporate giving is also decentralizing, with increasing sums following 
markets overseas. 44 
Interestingly, executives in this new environment often speak as if 
cause-related marketing and residual "true philanthropy" involved similar 
profit-maximizing objectives: one philanthropic executive insists, "[i]f 
we're perceived as people who just give away shareholders' money, we're 
not going to last very long. "45 Another adds, "[i]t's shareholder equity 
we're spending here. You can't have a function like this without looking 
at the return to the shareholder . . . . "46 While these statements may be 
disingenuous, they do reflect a continuing sensitivity to the lessons of the 
1980s. Namely, investors may be willing to tolerate some corporate 
philanthropy, but they are not likely to support companies' profligacy at 
their expense. 
B. The Recurring Motif of the Chief Executive Officer 
Throughout the five stages of corporate philanthropic activity, the 
chief executive officer has always played an important role. At a 
minimum, the CEO has consistently been seen as providing guidance or 
"setting the tone" for corporate giving. Most observers believe that 
companies whose CEOs place a high value on charitable giving typically 
give more generously than companies whose CEOs do not. Indeed, a 
1989 study reported that, "other factors being equal, the percentage of pre-
tax net income allocated to contributions by firms with highly committed 
chief executives was double that of firms whose CEO's commitment was 
low."47 
Still another study, one of 672 corporations based in 
Massachusetts, reveals that companies whose chief executives 
were more vigorously involved in the contributions effort 
43. "Instead of scattering their resources piecemeal, companies are involving all their 
business units around a project and building relationships." Sweeney, supra note 39. 
44. See Stan Crock, When Charity Doesn't Begin at Home, Bus. WK., Nov. 27, 
1995, at 6. 
45. Therrien, supra note 41, at 118 (quoting Eugene R. Wilson, president of the 
Arco Foundation). 
46. Molly McKaughan, Is Corporate Philanthropy Drying Up?, ACROSS THE BOARD, 
Apr. 1995, at 21, 22 (quoting Caroline 0. Boitano, president and executive director of 
the BankAmerica Foundation). 
47. Useem, Corporate Support, supra note 13, at 52. 
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experienced higher growth rates in their [philanthropic] budgets 
than did other finns. 48 
These studies, like most studies of business giving, unfortunately 
included both public and closely-held companies. Therefore, they are of 
limited value in evaluating the influence over charitable giving of public 
company CEOs. At least one recent study, however, focused exclusively 
on public companies and found a significant relationship between the 
CEO's personal level of "community orientation" and his company's level 
of charitable giving.49 In many companies today, public companies 
included, CEOs retain sole authority to detennine the amount of corporate 
funds that will be allocated to charitable activities.50 
Moreover, a CEO's involvement in corporate philanthropy does not 
end at setting the budget. According to a 1982 study, "enterprises with 
a chief executive who backed more spending on the arts were more than 
twice as likely as other companies to have enlarged the proportion of their 
gifts budget allocated to culture. "51 Another, more recent, survey 
confinned the influence of top-level executives, especially when it came 
to allocating funds to arts organizations. 52 In a study conducted in 1988, 
48. /d. (citing John Bartolomeo, The Attitudes and Motivations of Chief Executive 
Officers, in CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY: PHILOSOPHY, MANAGEMENT, TRENDS, 
FUTURE, BACKGROUND (Council on Foundations ed., 1982)). 
49. See Linda D. Lerner & Gerald E. Fryxell, CEO Stakeholder Attitudes and 
Corporate Social Activity in the Fortune 500, 33 Bus. & Soc. 58 (1994). Another study 
found that a public company whose CEO is well-entrenched and has been with the 
company for a long time is more likely to have a strong corporate social responsibility 
profile than a company whose CEO is a newcomer. See Anisya S. Thomas & Roy L. 
Simerly, The Chief Executive Officer and Corporate Social Performance: An 
Interdisciplinary Examination, 13 J. Bus. ETHICS 959, 965 (1994). 
50. See The Conference Board, Corporate Giving Strategies That Add Business 
Value, CONF. BoARD REs., 1995 (No. 11 26-95-RR) at 15 (reporting that 14.3% of the 
463 companies surveyed entrusted this decision solely to the CEO; 14.9% of the 
companies entrusted the decision to a management committee; 14.7% entrusted the 
decision to a contributions committee; 14.5% made the decision using a formula based 
on pre-tax net income; 6.7% based the decision on a strategic plan; and 21.4% made the 
decision based on some combination of the above). 
51. Useem, Corporate Support, supra note 13, at 52 (citing John Bartolomeo, The 
Attitudes and Motivations of Chief Executive Officers, in CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY: 
PHILOSOPHY, MANAGEMENT, TRENDS, FUTURE, BACKGROUND {Council on Foundations 
ed., 1982)). 
52. See William Grimes, Business Said to Put More In Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 
1995, at CIS ("In 1991, 82 percent of businesses reported that the chairman, chief 
executive officer or partner made decisions about charitable giving. In 1994, that figure 
dropped to 76 percent."). 
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two out of three CEOs described themselves as "the major influence on 
their companies' corporate giving policy. "53 
These studies are of limited value because of the indiscriminate mixing 
of both public and closely-held companies and because of the limitations 
of self-reporting. However, they lend support to the proposition that 
corporate chief executives today, as in the past, are often deeply involved 
in decisions about which organizations will receive charitable 
contributions. 54 Certainly, these CEOs devote a substantial amount of 
their time to the corporate giving enterprise.55 
Consider two recent examples of public company CEOs whose role in 
corporate philanthropy is both apparent and pervasive. A 1996 Economist 
profile of John Bryan, the CEO of Sara Lee, notes that Bryan often 
conducts himself "as if Sara Lee were still a family firm and he [was] still 
its owner. "56 
His own convictions [about, for instance, racial diversity] and 
interests [in, for example, fine art] permeate the company. Sara 
Lee owns a fine collection of impressionist paintings. It gives 
away about 2% of its pre-tax profits, at the upper end of what is 
common for big American companies. Under Mr. Bryan's 
influence this goes mainly to disadvantaged groups and cultural 
institutions.[] Another Bryan hobby-horse is the advancement of 
women in business.57 
53. COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, THE CLIMATE FOR CORPORATE GIVING: CURRENT 
AND FUTURE CEOS TALK ABOUT GIVING IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT 12 (1988). The 
size of the company may be important in determining just what role the CEO will play 
in philanthropic decision-making: "The CEO plays a key role in determining the level 
of giving. The larger the company, the less the CEO is involved in decisions about 
individual grants." /d. 
54. A study of public companies only, conducted from 1981 to 1985, noted that in 
response to the question "why do you believe that your company gives money to 
charitable organizations," 13.5% of the respondents answered that their companies did 
so to enable top level executives to support their favorite charities and 5.8% indicated that 
their companies' charitable contributions reflected the religious commitment of the CEO. 
See JOSEPH GALASKIEWICZ, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF AN URBAN GRANTS ECONOMY: 
A STUDY OF BUSINESS PHILANTHROPY AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 90 (1985). 
55. In a 1988 survey of 255 chief executive officers, 71% of the respondents 
characterized themselves as '"highly involved' in corporate giving activities; indeed, the 
CEOs •.. report[ed that], on average, [they] spendO four hours per week on corporate 
giving activities both during and after business hours." COUNCIL ON FouNDATIONS, 
supra note 53, at 6. 
56. The Cecil Rhodes of Chocolate-Chip Cookies, ECONOMIST, May 25, 1996, at 
74. 
57. ld. 
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Nation's Business recently profiled Edwin Lupberger, chairman and 
president of Entergy Corporation, one of the world's largest investor-
owned electric utilities, with more than $22.5 billion in. assets.58 
Lupberger' s achievements include the creation of an ambitious region-wide 
literacy program and "implementing the first so-called Fair Share 
agreement between an electric utility holding company and the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. "59 Mr. Lupberger 
is an active fund-raiser for the NAACP. 60 
It is not that these mens' philanthropies are inappropriate for their 
companies, or suboptimal (although they may be). The point is merely 
that, in many public companies today-including some very successful 
ones-the chief executive officer remains the driving force behind 
significant charitable decisions. To believe that CEOs' preferences have 
disappeared from the philanthropic mix is to underestimate both the power 
of many of today's CEOs and the importance that corporate philanthropy 
may play in their professional lives. These CEOs often fashion their self-
image in part on what they are able to accomplish philanthropically. 
To summarize, though the tradition of CEO micromanagement of 
corporate giving has surely waned in recent years, especially as 
"checkbook philanthropy" has declined, CEO influence over the specifics 
of corporate giving is very much alive and well. Today, as in the earlier 
stages of corporate philanthropy, the CEO's personal values and priorities 
often shape the giving practices in many public companies. 
III. WHEN CORPORATE CHARITABLE GIVING REPRESENTS AN 
ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
While a CEO's influence on corporate philanthropy may be benign, 
socially productive, and in some cases even profit-maximizing, that 
influence may also be quite inappropriate and ultimately a sign of peril to 
the corporation. Consider some recent examples of what one might call 
"idiosyncratic corporate giving" but what more appropriately should be 
described as "opportunistic corporate giving." None of these examples 
can reasonably be said to represent an attempt at profit-maximizing 
philanthropy. Furthermore, most of the examples to follow in this section 
cannot even be said to have advanced the corporation's public image. 
One such example is Charles Keating, CEO of Lincoln Savings, whose 
religious lay leadership often formed the basis for his company's charitable 
giving: using corporate funds, he generously supported India's Mother 
58. See Albert G. Holzinger, A Businessman on a Mission, NATION's Bus., May 
1996, at 66. 
59. ld. at 68. 
60. See id. 
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Theresa, the Reverend Bruce Ritter of Covenant House and other Catholic 
charities around the world. 61 He often loaned Mother Theresa use of his 
corporate jet or helicopter and loaned tens of millions of dollars to Father 
Bruce to renovate homeless shelters in New York City. 62 In 1983, Keating 
announced that his company would give $100,000 a year for ten years to 
the St. Vincent de Paul Society.63 "In two years, 1984 to 1986, Keating's 
corporations [contributed a total of] $6 million to charity. "64 Keating and 
his wife, on the other hand, reported almost no charitable contributions on 
their personal tax returns. 6 Lincoln Savings was ultimately (and 
notoriously) declared insolvent. 
The use of corporate funds to advance a CEO's pet charities has not 
been limited to the thrift industry, however, or to executives who later 
turned out to be felons. One of the most calculating uses of corporate 
philanthropy was found in the tobacco industry, where Ross Johnson, then 
CEO of RJR Nabisco, used a number of techniques to cosset his board of 
directors and ensure their personal loyalty to him. "'One of the most 
important jobs a CEO has is the care and feeding of the directors,' 
Johnson said. "66 To this end, Johnson had RJR Nabisco endow academic 
chairs in his directors' names at the universities of their choice.67 When 
he needed a critical vote from Paul Sticht, a former RJR executive serving 
on the company's board, Johnson offered Sticht a generous consulting 
contract and also arranged a $6 million donation from RJR to the J. Paul 
Sticht Center on Aging at the Bowman Gray School ofMedicine.68 "Sticht 
soon came around," observers note. 69 
At one point, Johnson arranged for the RJR Nabisco Foundation to 
make a "fat donation" to a small Florida college where one of his 
directors' wives was a trustee.70 In return, both Johnson and his wife 
received honorary degrees.71 Johnson often insisted that "Team Nabisco," 
a group of retired sports heroes who played in charity golf tournaments 
61. See MICHAEL BINSTEIN & CHARLES BOWDEN, TRUST ME: CHARLES KEATING 
AND THE MISSING BILLIONS 49 {1993). 
62. See id. 
63. See id. at 167. 
64. ld. at 49. 
65. See id. at 13. 
66. See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE 
FALL OF RJR NABISCO 26 {1990). 
67. See id. at 97. 
68. See id. at 82. 
69. ld. 
70. See id. at 83. 
71. See id. 
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around the country under the sponsorship of RJR, include the directors in 
their games. 72 Not surprisingly, when Johnson ultimately launched a 
leveraged buyout for the company in 1988, many of these directors 
supported Johnson in the face of national outrage at the gluttonous terms 
Johnson had crafted for himself. Johnson ultimately lost in the 
competition to take over RJR Nabisco, but not before becoming the virtual 
poster child for corporate greed. 
The entertainment industry, too, has seen examples of opportunistic 
corporate giving. The legendary Steve Ross, CEO of Time-Warner, Inc. 
until his death in 1992, was widely known for both his personal and his 
corporate generosity. He often took business associates on shopping 
sprees, acquiring expensive pieces of jewe1~.73 Business gifts valued at 
$50,000 or $100,000 were not uncommon. 4 Because of Ross's wife's 
interest in the Dallas Museum, Warner Communications (the predecessor 
to Time-Warner) made a million-dollar contribution to that museum;75 the 
company, under Mrs. Ross's guidance, also purchased millions of dollars 
worth of "'corporate art. "76 
Ross sometimes whipped out a company checkbook to make 
substantial corporate contributions, never consulting with a committee. 77 
Under Ross's direction, Warner Communications lavishly supported the 
pet charities of its directors78 and sometimes made six-figure gifts in their 
honor.79 As in the case of RJR's Ross Johnson, Steve Ross's behavior 
gave rise to a remarkably sugine board of directors which often failed to 
rein in the CEO's excesses.8 
The heavy industry sector has also seen its share of opportunistic 
corporate giving: The since-deposed CEO of Morrison-Knudsen Co., 
72. See id. at 26. 
73. See CONNIE BRUCK, MAsTER OF THE GAME: STEVE ROSS AND THE CREATION 
OF TIME WARNER 103 (1994). 
74. See id. at 204. 
75. See id. at 212. 
76. See id. at 168. 
77. See id. at 212 (recounting a $250,000 corporate check written to a California 
museum representative during a casual meeting in Ross's hotel room). 
78. See id. at 223 (detailing gifts to the New York City Opera Company at the 
request of board member Beverly Sitts). 
79. See id. at 232 (noting a $500,000 gift in honor of board member Mac 
Schwebel). 
80. According to former Senator Abraham Ribicoff, who resigned from Warner's 
board, the board was completely manipulated by Steve Ross. See id. at 234. "I have 
never in all my life been with a board so subservient to the chairman or the chief 
executive officer of any company," Ribicoff said. !d. 
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William Agee, arranged substantial cash grants from the Morrison-
Knudsen Foundation to his wife's pet charity, The Nurturing Network.81 
The corporation itself made substantial in-kind contributions to the pro-life 
organization. 82 Furthermore, Agee spent lavishly on personal travel, 
amenities and a corporate headquarters-in-exile in Carmel, California 
because he did not care for the lifestyle or cultural offerings of Boise, 
Idaho.83 The company ultimately entered bankruptcy. · 
Perhaps the most audacious of the CEOs who have recognized the 
value of access to corporate charitable funds was Armand Hammer of 
Occidental Petroleum. The executive, who insisted on being called 
"Doctor" Hammer, 
used the company treasury for his philanthropic activities and to 
buy works of art for the Armand Hammer Collection. Occidental 
subsidized the yearly Armand Hammer Conference on Peace and 
Human Rights. It financed Armand Hammer Productions, which 
produced films and books about Hammer's global activities, 
particularly his role as a self-appointed ambassador to establish 
peaceful relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
.... Nearly a hundred million dollars of Occidental's funds had 
gone into the Armand Hammer Museum of Art and Cultural 
Center.84 
When Armand Hammer died, his successor immediately discontinued 
most of Occidental's ongoing charitable projects. The market had clearly 
recognized that Hammer's preoccupation with these activities had checked 
Occidental's growth. Upon news of Hammer's death, Occidental's stock 
value rose nearly $600 million overnight. 85 The era when this colorful 
CEO could unilaterally direct his public company's "charitable" program 
for his own self-aggrandizement had at last come to an end. 
These five stories are not exceptional, except insofar as each emerged 
from aggressive and effective journalistic projects; they are, rather, 
81. See Diana B. Henriques, Ties That Bind: His Directors, Her Charity, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at Dl. 
82. See id. 
83. See Brian O'Reilly, Agee in Exile, FORTUNE, May 29, 1995, at 50. 
84. Edward Jay Epstein, The Last Days of Annand Hammer, NEW YORKER, Sept. 
23, 1996, at 36, 36. When an Occidental shareholder challenged the art museum 
expenditures, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld them as being within the bounds of the 
business judgment rule. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (declining 
to upset a settlement of the case). 
85. SeeSusanAntilla, WhenaC.E.O.'sPainisaGain,N.Y. TIMES, Nov.!, 1992, 
at CIS. 
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illustrative of the dark side of executives' pet charities. When powerful 
chief executives, especially those with long tenure, begin to treat the 
corporate coffers as their own, they are very likely to damage the 
company, the integrity of its internal control mechanisms, and the sense 
of fiduciary obligation that is at the center of the CEO's institutional role. 
It is rare that a CEO's charitable projects are of financial significance 
themselves. However, time and time again CEOs who engage in abuses 
of the philanthropic function also lose control over the organizations they 
head. What I propose here is that usurpation of the corporate giving 
decision-making authority may be a signal of other managerial problems 
that are worthy of investors' attention. 
IV. WHY A CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER MAY CLAIM THE 
CORPORATION'S POWER TO MAKE A CHARITABLE GIFT 
Sociologist Joseph Galaskiewicz has identified five primary reasons 
why corporations engage in philanthropy: (1) philanthropy stimulates 
marketing; (2) philanthropy serves as a positive public relations tool; (3) 
philanthropy may be motivated by "enlightened self-interest" in the sense 
that serving community needs may result in long tenn loyalty by workers, 
consumers and others; (4) philanthropy may provide some useful tax 
benefits to the corporation; and (5) "company contributions [may] be made 
to elicit the applause and approval of business peers and local 
philanthropic elites. "86 It is this last motivation-clearly a self-serving one 
for upper level executives-that is the practical focus of this commentary. 
According to Galaskiewicz, corporate charitable giving may be 
stimulated by peer pressure brought to bear on CEOs, and by these CEOs' 
logical desire to be thought of as generous by other corporate leaders: 
Through the institution of peer pressure, executives learn the 
expectations of their peers, are solicited: and are awarded certain 
status benefits [for responding]. Giving is the nonn in many 
business elite subcultures, and those who want to remain in the 
inner circles had best conform and make the appropriate 
contributions. 87 
Galaskiewicz's evidence for this scenario is derived from his study of 
corporate charitable behavior among public companies headquartered in 
Minneapolis in the early 1980s. The following were among his findings: 
86. Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More than 
a Marketing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 
251, 252 (Richard Magat ed., 1989). 
87. !d. 
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(1) "companies gave more money to charity if their officers and directors 
were in the networks of locally prominent business persons active in 
philanthropic affairs. This effect was independent of pretax earnings, 
percent of sales to consumers, [or] the birthplace of the CE0;" 88 (2) 
"companies that were better integrated into the social circles of the 
corporate phWmthropic elite tended to give more money to charities that 
the elite either supported or used themselves;"89 (3) "[e]xecutives' social 
positions influenced the specific allocations that their companies made, as 
well as the overall amount;"90 (4) "companies that contributed more money 
to charity or supported nonprofit organizations that the philanthropic elite 
itself patronized were recognized by more members of the corporate 
philanthropic elite as being very generous; "91 and (5) "companies that gave 
more money to charity were recognized by more members of the corporate 
philanthropic elite as being very successful businesses, even controlling for 
pretax earnings and performance ratios. "92 
In other words, CEOs who are generally successful in increasing their 
corporations' charitable contributions, and specifically successful in 
directing corporate charitable contributions toward organizations whose 
goals are favored among their social and business peers, are perceived by 
those peers as being more successful in business, and hence more valued 
colleagues, than other CEOs who are less influential in stimulating 
corporate charitable gifts. In economic terms, stimulating corporate 
charitable activity enhances one's value in the market for managerial labor. 
Galaskiewicz's findings confirm what most observers have intuitively 
suspected for years-that just as non-profit organizations exploit corporate 
executives and other wealthy members of their boards of trustees, 93 
corporate executives and other wealthy members of non-profit boards 
exploit those organizations in turn. One example of this reciprocal 
arrangement is the exchange of honorary degrees for sizeable contributions 
88. ld. at 253. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 254. 
92. Id. 
93. See NANCY R. LONDON, JAPANESE CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 117 (1991) 
("[I]n the United States it is widely acknowledged that powerful corporate executives are 
often invited to sit on the boards of eleemosynary institutions precisely because of their 
connections to sources of funds-from their own corporate till and others . . . . "); 
Michael Useem, Market and Institutional Factors in Corporate Contributions, 30 CAL. 
MGMT. REv. 77, 86 (1988) [hereinafter Useem, Market and Institutional Factors] 
("Drawing on the network of mutual influence and obligation within the highest circles 
of corporate leadership may have become one of the most effective avenues for attracting 
corporate suppon. "). 
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to a college or university. 94 For every chief executive officer who receives 
an honorary degree, one can reasonably expect to find a compensating 
donation to the institution, sooner or later. Both sides benefit from this 
bargain-the university receives needed funds and the CEO gains in 
prestige. 
Similar reciprocity exists in other non-profit areas. Non-profits 
(including colleges and universities) that are persistent enough to lure an 
influential CEO onto their boards can often expect some corporate support 
to follow. At the same time, CEOs often accept board positions 
strategically; they use their service on "mid-level" non-profit boards to 
seek "promotion" to higher-status boards.95 
Galaskiewicz's conclusions might be discounted as focusing on too 
localized a giving community, Minneapolis. 96 Corporate giving today has 
become more decentralized than in the early 1980s and more global. 97 
Nevertheless, Galask~ewicz's conclusion that corporate chief executives 
may have ulterior motives for seeking to influence their company's 
charitable giving practices is just as valid today as it was when his study 
was conducted. CEOs still get personal gratification from making visible 
contributions to the communities in which they live98 and otherwise in 
implementing their philanthropic priorities. That successful executives like 
John Bryan99 or Edwin Lupberger100 can enjoy that sense of gratification, 
94. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
95. See John A. Byrne, Profiting from the Nonprofits, Bus. WK., Mar. 26, 1990, 
at 66. 
96. Minneapolis is an especially atypical community in that the tradition of corporate 
generosity has been institutionalized there for many years. CEOs in Minneapolis have 
long been encouraged to belong to the "Five Percent Club," and to pledge up to five 
percent of their companies' pre-tax earnings to philanthropic causes. Similar traditions 
are not commonly found in other American headquarters cities. 
97. See Judy B. Rosener, When Philanthropy Becomes Strategic, Something's Golla 
Give, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1996, at D5 (noting movement of corporate charitable funds 
from local to national and international venues). 
98. Studies have shown a significant preference for donations in the city in which 
the corporate headquarters is located, even where company operations are widespread. 
See Useem, Market and Institutional Factors, supra note 93, at 82 ("According to one 
study, companies give approximately $40 per employee to nonprofits near plant locations; 
by contrast, they give $200 per employee to nonprofits near headquarters."); see also 
Siegfried et al., supra note 17, at 93 (noting that when charitable giving is controlled by 
the CEO or a committee of executives, the percentage of funds allocated to charities in 
the headquarters city is much larger than where giving is controlled by a foundation staff 
or by the board itself). 
99. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
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and at the same time become CEO role models, perpetuates the tradition 
of opportunistic corporate giving. 
V. THREE POSSffiLE REsPONSES TO OPPORTUNISTIC CORPORATE 
GIVING: IGNORE IT, PROHIBIT IT, OR DISCLOSE IT 
What, if anything, is to be done about the kinds of behaviors 
documented in this commentary? One possibility is to do nothing. 
Investors seem to tolerate the practice, 101 non-profits have benefitted from 
it, and executives can fairly characterize the practice as an alternative (and 
usually insignificant) form of non-cash compensation. 
At first glance, maintaining the status quo appears to be an entirely 
legitimate response to concerns about opportunistic corporate giving. As 
a practical matter, truly egregious abuses are uncommon and the more 
common forms of abuses are innocuous. Hence, one might argue, there 
is no need for legal or other intervention. However, as noted below, the 
current system can easily be improved. To this end, I support a minor 
amendment to the current federal disclosure requirements so as to expose 
to public scrutiny those corporate charitable contributions of most 
immediate interest to investors. In addition, in Section VII, I urge a 
rethinking of current corporate governance practices so as to focus energy 
where it is most needed: On those situations in which a CEO (or other 
executive) is exceeding her authority or behaving irresponsibly. Both of 
these suggestions involve minimal cost and disruption to the current status 
quo. 
A second possible response to opportunistic corporate giving is to ban 
corporate charitable contributions altogether. Many critics have argued 
that corporations should not make charitable contributions102 or should 
never do so absent a clearly identifiable corporate benefit. 103 One 
101. This may be a function of a collective action problem. When asked to 
characterize shareholder proposals related to corporate philanthropy, the SEC in recent 
years has treated them as matters relating to the conduct of the Company's "ordinary 
business operations" and has permitted corporations to withhold these proposals from 
consideration by shareholders. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 
SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4291 (SEC). Shareholders 
therefore have no practical means of objecting to opportunistic giving practices. 
102. This position has most forcefully been argued by Milton Friedman. See 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 135 (1962) ("Such giving by 
corporations is an inappropriate use of corporate funds in a free-enterprise society."). 
103. There was a time when corporate charitable contributions were thought to be 
ultra vires expenditures because they generated no benefit for the corporation. Even 
where permitted, these contributions were deductible only if the corporation could 
demonstrate a corresponding benefit flowing directly to the corporation. See Old Mission 
Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 289, 293 (1934). The rule regarding 
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commentator has suggested that, rather than condemning corporate 
charitable contributions outright, we should instead treat them as ordinary 
and necessary businesses expenses, but only where the conditions for such 
treatment, including the receipt by the donor of some measurable quid pro 
quo, are met. 104 
The abolitionist position has the advantage of being relatively easy to 
administer. It overlooks, however, the real social value of many "true" 
corporate charitable contributions-those that cannot be disguised as a 
cause-related marketing project or those that have no direct impact on 
employee well-being or local good will. Prohibiting such charitable 
contributions altogether would have a grievously harmful effect on many 
valuable projects such as the funding of educational programs away from 
the headquarters city, or the support of important but controversial 
programs such as those associated with AIDS or family planning. In the 
absence of any foreseeable source of replacement funds for these groups, 
the abolitionist position is undesirable and, for most Americans, 
indefensible. 
A more limited abolitionist position-one that would permit corporate 
charitable gifts generally but would prohibit certain opportunistic corporate 
gifts-might provide a more palatable option. The problem with outlawing 
a class of corporate gifts based on the motivations behind them, however, 
is one of definition. How would opportunistic corporate gifts be 
distinguished from similar, though "untainted" and therefore acceptable, 
corporate gifts?105 
One possibility-a bright line rule-would prohibit charitable gifts 
from a corporation where an executive officer of the corporation106 (or 
deductibility was changed with passage of the 1935 Revenue Act, which authorized 
corporate charitable deductions up to five percent (now ten percent) of pre-tax earnings, 
without regard to any corporate benefit. See Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 
49 Stat. 1014. 
104. See Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tat Expenditures, 
the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. 
REv. I, 10, 41-42 (1994) (advocating this approach). 
105. This question suggests that every corporate gift would have to fall into one or 
the other category, which of course will not always be true. Many charitable gifts derive 
from both a "true" philanthropic motivation and some other, more self-serving one. See 
United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986) (discussing 
charitable contributions that have a "dual character"). 
106. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-7 (1991) (defining "executive officer" to include the 
president, any vice president, or any other officer who performs a policy making function 
or any other person who performs similar policy making functions for the registrant). 
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members of the executive's immediate family)107 simultaneously sits on the 
board of the non-profit recipient. A more encompassing alternative to this 
simple "interlocking directorate" test would be to prohibit charitable gifts 
from a corporation where the charitable decision-maker has a demonstrable 
conflict of interest. 108 
The problems with prohibitions of this sort are obvious: (1) effective 
prohibition of opportunistic corporate contributions would require 
legislation in all fifty states; such a campaign would be both costly, time-
consuming and unlikely of success; (2) the process of defining the 
disqualifying conflicts of interest, though manageable, would consume 
many lobbying and legislative resources; (3) any such prohibition would 
inevitably give rise to evasive corporate behavior, including widespread 
resignations of corporate executives from non-profit boards. This course 
of action would do little to eliminate opportunistic corporate giving; it 
would instead simply injure the non-profit recipients. Alternative 
responses, such as "I'll make your contribution you make mine" 
arrangements among corporate executives in different firms, would offer 
little improvement over the current state of affairs. 
In the end, any blanket prohibition (even of opportunistic corporate 
gifts, however defined) seems both impractical and undesirable.109 
Professor Kahn's proposal-that corporate charitable gifts be disclosed in 
public companies' annual filings110-makes far more sense. Disclosure is 
less likely than some form of prohibition to dry up legitimate corporate 
giving. It also has the advantage of being easier to implement, given that 
it would be imposed on public companies only and on a national, rather 
than a state by state, basis. 
The nature and detail of the required disclosure will be an important 
factor in considering how the "sunshine" regime might best inhibit 
opportunistic corporate giving. An easily translatable model is the 
disclosure requirement now applicable to commercial conflicts of interest. 
107. Cf. 17 C.F.R. 240.16a-1(e) (1991) (defining "immediate family" to include any 
child, stepchild, grandchild, parent, stepparent, grandparent, spouse, sibling, mother-in-
law, father-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law, and 
including adoptive relationships). 
108. Cf. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.60 (1994) (defining "conflicting 
interest" to include those transactions in which an executive "is so closely linked to" the 
contracting party that the relationship would reasonably be expected to influence the 
executive's decision as to whether to authorize the transaction). 
109. Corporate law has long recognized that not all managerial conflicts of interests 
are inappropriate. In the context of self-interested business transactions, both courts and 
legislatures have afforded wide leeway to corporate boards to determine when a particular 
transaction is desirable or undesirable. 
110. See Kahn, supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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Under the federal proxy rules, public companies must disclose all 
commercial transactions in which a director or executive officer, or 
members of their families, have a direct or indirect material interest and 
in which the amount in issue is at least $60,000. 111 At a minimum, the 
definition of "transaction" in this context could easily be clarified to 
include corporate charitable contributions. If no other disclosures 
regarding corporate giving were compelled by federal law, this change 
alone would materially advance the interest of shareholders in monitoring 
opportunistic gifts. 
VI. A PAIR OF ADDITIONAL POSSffiLE RESPONSES: 
TREAT A CORPORATION'S "PET CHARITY" CONTRIBUTIONS AS INCOME 
TAXABLE TO THE CEO OR DISALLOW THE CORPORATE DEDUCTION 
Both the Tax Court and the Internal' Revenue Service have taken the 
position that unless a corporate charitable contribution confers some 
measurable "economic benefit" on a corporate executive, it need not be 
treated as a constructive dividend 112 or otherwise as compensation to the 
executive. 113 A better approach might be to recognize that there is some 
economic benefit that accrues to those who control corporate charitable 
contributions. The value of that benefit could be taxed to them 
individually. 
A simple way to do this would be to treat an opportunistic corporate 
charitable contribution as cash compensation to the executive, followed by 
111. See 11 C.F.R. § 229.404{a) (1994) (Regulation S-K, Item 404). 
112. See Knott v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 681 (1977) (explaining that where 
controlling shareholders directed that a corporate gift be made to one of their favored 
charities, but "did not receive property or other benefits" as a result of the gift, the 
amount of the gift was deductible to the corporation and not treated as dividend income 
to the shareholder); Rev. Rul. 79-9, 1979-1 C.B. 125 (acquiescing in Knott and revoking 
prior rulings to the effect that a charitable contribution by a closely-held corporation will 
be treated as a constructive dividend to the controlling shareholder(s) if the contribution 
serves only the personal interests of the shareholder(s)). 
113. Similarly, when rank-and-file employees have been called upon merely to 
designate a charitable beneficiary, without receiving any personal benefit, they have not 
been treated as having received gross income in the amount of the corporation's charitable 
contributions in their names. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 1992 LEXIS 39877, at *26; see 
also Rev. Rul. 67-137, 1967-1 C.B. 63 (stating that where employees designate a charity, 
the corporation's gift paid directly to that charity will not be treated as compensation to 
the employee). 
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a personal charitable contribution made by her. 114 Typically, these two 
payments would offset each other on the taxpayer's return but under some 
circumstances (for example, where the contribution exceeds fifty percent 
of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income)115 that would not be the case. 116 
There are some obvious pitfalls in this scheme-the first is the (largely 
hypothetical) risk that a corporation would use this approach as a means 
of circumventing the Internal Revenue Code's cap on the amount of 
charitable contributions that a corporation may deduct. 117 More 
significantly, the same definitional problems relating to the prohibition of 
opportunistic corporate gifts described above would also apply to the 
characterization of corporate gifts for purposes of individual taxation. 
That is, which corporate charitable contributions would be treated as 
compensation to an executive and which as "real" corporate philanthropy? 
This problem might be solved as a matter of draftsmanship, but 
implementation of such a scheme would be problematic. A bright-line rule 
inclusive of family members' charitable activities would invade the 
family's privacy at a level likely to be unacceptable to most corporate 
executives. A more expansive definition of the triggering relationship 
between an executive and a charity would present even greater problems. 
In either case, such a definition would put lower-level corporate employees 
into an extremely difficult position. They could ignore the triggering 
relationship and hope the company does not get audited, or they could 
114. A more radical way to treat opportunistic corporate charitable contributions 
might be to attach some economic value to the "psychic" or "status" rewards enjoyed by 
the corporate executive who authorizes corporate charitable contributions, and impute that 
value only to her as compensation. This approach, not surprisingly, would present a 
number of problems. Just how would one distinguish those benefits that would trigger 
imputation (e.g., an improved position in the business leaders' network; an enhanced 
likelihood that the CEO will come to the attention of executive recruiters) from those 
benefits that fall short of the necessary threshold (e.g., profound satisfaction at having 
helped a local art museum reach its fund-raising goal; a sense of religious fulfillment in 
seeing medical supplies delivered to third world countries)? Who in the corporate 
hierarchy would decide? And how would value be determined? The problems of 
enforcement under this scheme would be insurmountable. 
115. See I.R.C. § 170(d) (1994) (limiting an individual's charitable deduction to 
50% of adjusted gross income in a single tax year). 
116. There could also be a problem if the value of the contribution, taken together 
with other forms of compensation, put the executive over the $1 million "cap" for 
allowable executive compensation. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (1994). As Linda Sugin points 
out, treating corporate contributions as individual contributions "would likely produce 
some tax burden for managers." Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax 
Treatment of Corporate Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 835, 871-72 (1997). 
117. This risk is hypothetical because so few corporations, and virtually no publicly-
held corporations, ever get close to the 10% cap on charitable giving. 
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insist that the gift be treated as compensation to the boss. Neither option 
is attractive; trying to sort out the "mixed motive" cases would be even 
more impossible. 
Rather than treating opportunistic corporate charitable contributions as 
compensation to the decision-maker, one might consider an alternative tax-
based approach. A corporation could be denied a charitable deduction 
where the decision-maker authorizing the contribution anticipates some 
personal benefit from the gift. 118 Under current law, corporate charitable 
contributions that confer incidental benefits on the corporation, its 
executives, or others, do not lose their characterization as a charitable 
contribution under the Internal Revenue Code. 119 An exception to this rule 
could be made for opportunistic corporate contributions. 
Any scheme that would deny a deduction at the corporate level for 
contributions made to an executive's pet charity would generate problems 
similar to those we have already explored. A bright line test might be 
devised to exclude those contributions to organizations on whose board the 
CEO (or her spouse) serves actively. A regulation might more broadly 
attempt to define and identify "conflict of interest" contributions. 120 Either 
way, the result would be wholesale resignations by corporate executives 
from non-profit boards. Many opportunistic gifts would still be made; the 
only difference would be a significant loss of leadership in the non-profit 
sector. 
In the end, using the federal income tax system as a vehicle to 
discourage opportunistic corporate giving would inevitably create more 
118. This treatment would be consistent with the rule that a charitable deduction is 
unavailable under Section 170, where the donor expects some quid pro quo for her 
contribution, even where the expected return is intangible or even spiritual. See Knauer, 
supra note 104, at 36, 39 (citing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) 
(holding that a donor may not claim a deduction under § 170 where the donee (Church 
of Scientology) is expected to provide religious instruction in exchange for the gift)). 
119. See Rev. Rul. 67-144, 1967-2 C.B. 119 (although retailers would receive an 
incidental benefit from charitable fund's efforts to remove ugly railroad facilities from the 
downtown area, their contributions to the fund were nevertheless deductible as a 
charitable contribution under § 170); see also Kenneth J. Yerkes, Note, Corporate 
Charitable Contributions: Expanding the Judicial Analysis in a Post-Economic Recovery 
Act World, 58 IND. L.J. 161, 181-82 (1982). 
!d. 
As long as a corporation or other transferring business entity does not receive 
a benefit commensurate with the value of the interest transferred and the 
general public is sufficiently benefited, there is no statutory or policy 
justification for denying a claimed charitable deduction. The state of mind or 
purpose behind the corporate decision to make the transfer is not relevant to the 
analysis. 
120. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text. 
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problems than it would solve. A preferable alternative would be for 
boards of directors to monitor charitable giving practices-including the 
identity of individual recipients and the decision-makers who have selected 
them-in the same way they currently monitor other conflict-of-interest 
transactions. This would put oversight of opportunistic giving where it 
belongs-not in the hands of the SEC or the Internal Revenue Service but 
in the hands of those representing shareholders' interests. 
VII. RAISE PHILANTHROPY TO A BOARD-LEVEL AGENDA ITEM 
As I have suggested elsewhere, 121 directors ought to include in their 
annual agendas a systematic periodic review of corporate charitable giving 
practices. Only a handful of co~orations today set aside time, or appoint 
a committee, for this purpose. 1 
There are several reasons why corporate philanthropy, among the 
hundreds of issues that might occupy the board's attention, is worthy of 
regular, board-level review. First, of course, is the inherently public 
nature of philanthropy-under state law in particular, non-profit 
organizations are held to high standards of public accountability and are 
consequently often the subject of critical, indeed, sanctimonious, press 
scrutiny. 123 Second, corporate philanthropy often implicates controversial 
121. See Jayne W. Barnard, Sovereign Prerogatives, 21 J. CORP. L. 307, 319-20 
(1996). 
122. See KORN FERRY INTERNATIONAL, 23RD ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
STUDY 14 (1996) (noting that only 19% of surveyed companies have a standing board 
committee on corporate responsibility). Some corporations do elevate decisions relating 
to charitable contributions to the board level. For example, in resisting inclusion of a 
shareholder proposal regarding establishment of a scholarship fund in its 1993 proxy, 
NBB Bancorp., Inc. described the oversight role of a special committee of its board as 
follows: 
A special committee of the Directors of the Corporation reviews the hundreds 
of requests for donations that are received each year and determines which of 
them meet the Corporation's established criteria. The approved requests are 
funded from a donation budget, which is based upon a percentage of estimated 
net income. A great amount of management and staff time is spent organizing 
the material to be presented at the special committee meetings. All requests are 
answered, whether approved or rejected. 
NBB Bancorp Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 25, 1993, available in 1993 WL 52189. 
123. See Nancy R. Axelrod, Behind the Board Room Doors: The Actions of 
Nonprofit Boards Are Increasingly Likely to be Held Up to Public Scrutiny, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 30, 1995, at A27 (describing the intense press coverage of problems at blue-
chip national charitable organizations including the United Way of America and the 
NAACP). 
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social issues,124 invites criticism of the suitability of the donor,125 and, where 
executives' involvement in a charity is deep, may give rise to embarrassing 
claims of management incompetence. 126 In any of these events, corporate 
charitable practices may (at best) become a lightning rod for unflattering 
press attention or (at worst) become items of concern to short sellers and 
institutional investors. 
There are other reasons why a corporation's charitable giving program 
is an appropriate subject for the board's attention: (1) even moderate abuse 
of the charitable prerogative may give rise to corrosive employee 
disrespect for the CEO; and (2) excessive abuse of the corporate 
philanthropic function may serve as a distant early warning signal of other 
forms of management misconduct. 127 
Still, does it make sense to require corporate directors to regularly 
review the details of a corporation's giving plan? In a universe of 
competing demands on directors, one must make a strong case for adding 
an additional, often financially immaterial, item to the list of issues they 
must regularly consider. The current wisdom is that directors should 
address themselves to just five thematic issues: (1) evaluation of the CEO 
and executive succession options; (2) approval of overall financial 
objectives; (3) general oversight of ongoing operations; (4) board 
succession; and (5) a "systems audit" function. 128 
What may not be obvious from this list is the need to attend to several 
other areas that inevitably give rise to executive conflicts of interest: 
conflicting interest transactions themselves, 129 executive compensation 
issues, and corporate opportunities as they arise. In addition, boards need 
124. A widely discussed example of controversial charitable activities centers on the 
abortion services provided by Planned Parenthood. Though abortion services represent 
only a small portion of the organization's total budget, Planned Parenthood has become 
a lightning rod for abortion opponents. One feature of the pro-life movement includes 
consumer boycotts against companies that have made charitable contributions to Planned 
Parenthood. See Richard Gibson, Boycott Drive Against Pioneer Hi-Bred Shows Perils 
of Corporate Philanthropy, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1992, at B1 (detailing company's 
decision to discontinue gifts to rural family planning clinics). 
125. See Mervyn Rothstein, Uneasy Partners: Arts and Philip Morris, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 18, 1990, at C15 (examining proposals that arts organizations refuse tobacco 
sponsorships). 
126. See Axelrod, supra note 123 (noting criticisms of the boards of the United Way 
and the NAACP for failing, in each case, to effectively monitor those organizations' chief 
executives). 
127. See, e.g., supra notes 61-65, 81-85. 
128. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AMERICAN 
COMPETITIVENESS 7 (1990). 
129. See REviSED MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.60 (1994). 
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to attend periodically to other, facially neutral matters such as customer 
entertainment practices130 or headquarters siting decisions131 that can give 
rise to appearances of impropriety, lead to adverse media attention, and 
may ultimately undermine investor confidence in management. 
A. Boards Need to Monitor Those Activities 
Singularly Prone to Executive Opponunism 
Agency theory posits that boards of directors are uniquely situated in 
public companies to monitor and control the opportunistic behavior of 
incumbent management. 132 Opportunistic behavior may manifest itself with 
respect to such issues as managerial compensation, perquisites, investment 
in unprofitable projects and excessive use of free cash flow. 133 In light of 
the personal advantages that may accrue to executives who authorize 
corporate charitable contributions, opportunism may also be evident when 
decisions are being made about the size of those contributions and the 
identity of the recipients.134 This is where the board of directors, and 
especially outside directors, have an important moderating role to 
play.l3s 
A fair question to be raised at this point is whether the time devoted 
to reviewing charitable activities would be repaid by information that is 
useful to the board in other contexts. One of the reasons opportunistic 
130. See Mark Maremont, Abuse of Power, Bus. WK., May 13, 1996, at 86 
(describing the presence of prostitutes, abuse of alcohol and harassment of women 
employees at Astra USA sales functions). 
131. See Alan R. Myerson, Follow the Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at Dl 
(describing a number of companies whose CEOs have orchestrated a relocation of the 
corporate headquarters to be near to their home or favorite sporting site). 
132. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual 
Claims, 26 J .L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation 
of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & W. H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976). 
133. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, 
and Takeovers, 16 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 
134. See Jia Wang & Betty S. Coffey, Board Composition and Corporate 
Philanthropy, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 771, 773 (1992) ("Corporate philanthropy is an issue 
about which principals and agents are likely to have conflicting views."). 
135. Studies have shown that a company whose board is controlled by outsiders is 
less likely to make charitable contributions than one whose board has a lower proportion 
of outsiders. See id. at 775. Similarly, a company with a strong (more than five percent) 
non-executive owner gives less to charities than a company with widely-dispersed 
ownership. See Lisa Atkinson & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Stock Ownership and Company 
Contributions to Charity, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 82, 93 (1988). 
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giving has flourished is presumably because boards of directors have 
believed that monitoring costs were excessive and that the issue of 
corporate philanthropy was unworthy of their regular attention. 136 Another 
reason, unfortunately, may be that outside directors have often been co" 
opted in the guise of corporate philanthropy and may have their own 
conflicts of interest. Donations in their names to special charities are a 
common perquisite of board service.137 The rise of "charitable awards 
programs," in which corporations purchase substantial life insurance 
policies on the lives of their directors, payable to the director's chosen 
charity upon death, 138 makes it all the more uncomfortable for directors to 
challenge other forms of philanthropoid behavior, and all the more 
unlikely they will do so. 
In many cases, I must concede, an exacting review of a company's 
charitable giving activities will not reveal any information that is likely to 
be transportable to the overall assessment of management's performance. 
Excesses in philanthropy are seldom as useful an indicator of managerial 
profligacy as are, say, the purchase of a fleet of corporate vanity jets or 
the existence of low interest loans to insiders. 139 Nevertheless, a board 
level review of corporate philanthropy may have a positive spillover effect: 
just as bank regulators have found that some managerial behaviors are 
more effective signals of future bank failures than others, 140 investigators 
with decent data would likely conclude that opportunistic corporate 
philanthropy is a more effective signal of future corporate distress than 
many other executive behaviors. I cannot prove this relationship, but 
reason and real world observation suggests that often, opportunistic 
corporate giving is but one of many symptoms of what some have called 
"CEO disease, " 141 and what all have observed as the perilous situation 
when a CEO becomes unable to distinguish between his own priorities and 
those of the corporation he heads. Time after time, this loss of boundaries 
136. See James R. Boatsman & Sanjay Gupta, Tates and Corporate Charity: 
Empirical Evidence from Micro-level Panel Data, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 193, 209 (1996). 
137. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
138. See Dana Wechsler Linden & Robert Lenzner, The Cosseted Director, FORBES, 
May 22, 1995, at 168 (describing such programs). Typically the policies are for $1 
million. One financial advisory firm says it is now doing new charity plans for directors 
at the rate of one every two weeks. See id. 
139. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every 
Business Now a Bank?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 237 (1988). 
140. See John P. Forde, Study Shows Insider Loans May Signal Failure- Research 
Finds Many Loans to Bank Officials Portend Trouble, AM. BANKER, July 9, 1987, at 3 
(describing study suggesting that one-third of bank failures involve insider lending abuse). 
141. John A. Byrne, CEO Disease, Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 1991, at 52. 
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and the sense that "I am the company and the company is me" is a chilling 
precursor of later corporate ruin. 
B. The Need for a Corporate Giving Policy that Clearly 
Articulates the Corporation • s Objectives 
A board of directors can oversee corporate giving without 
micromanaging it. The steps involved in this process are simple: (1) 
ascertain that there is a rational giving plan in place; (2) confirm that the 
plan is being followed; and (3) ensure that the CEO is not interfering with, 
or substituting her judgment for, the plan that has been established and 
approved by the board. Using this approach, the board might also give 
the CEO some discretionary funds earmarked for use in rewarding her 
"pet charities." These funds, however, would be considered as part of the 
CEO's overall compensation package. 142 
There are a number of specific ways in which corporate boards might 
oversee the charitable giving program. One way to approach this task 
might be to require that corporate giving executives articulate a medium 
to long-term "philanthropic contributions plan" in the same way, and with 
the same degree of specificity, that individual business units do. At a 
minimum, boards ought to insist that management develop guidelines for 
charitable giving that are as subject to internal audit as all other corporate 
policies. A more exacting approach would be to require management to 
identify and quantify the specific benefit(s) which they predict will accrue 
from the corporation's anticipated charitable contributions, and then weigh 
the results against those predictions, as part of the overall management 
assessment. 
Regardless of the board's approach, however, a company's directors 
should be aware of the corporation's charitable objectives and have some 
means of measuring how well the company is meeting its charitable goals. 
More importantly, the board should have a strong sense of the role that the 
CEO is playing in setting the giving strategy and determining the identity 
of charitable recipients. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Whether one approaches the issue of corporate philanthropy from a 
traditional or a conununitarian perspective, the current state of the law and 
practice of corporate philanthropy is unsettling. As a practical matter, 
corporate charitable gifts may be made without any regard to their impact 
on shareholder wealth, thus calling into question traditional corporate law 
142. How these funds would be treated for tax purposes would be a separate issue, 
presumably not within the purview of the board. 
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norms; 143 at the same time, corporate charitable gifts need not be animated 
by any real corporate commitment to social betterment or shared 
community values, thus undermining and trivializing emerging 
communitarian theories about the essentially public nature of the 
corporation. 144 
One need not commit, moreover, to either the traditional or the 
communitarian view of the corporation to recognize that a regime that 
permits unfettered CEO interference in corporate philanthropic activities 
is not a healthy one for the long-term integrity of the corporation. 
Permitting corporate executives to impose their personal values or status 
aspirations on the process of corporate giving is inconsistent with sound 
corporate governance practices and may ultimately be harmful to investors. 
In this commentary, I have proposed that corporate boards of directors 
become more involved in, or at least more aware of, the philanthropic 
activities of the companies on whose boards they sit. This proposal does 
not require legislative enactment, the imprimatur of the American Law 
Institute, or even the wake-up call of a Delaware Supreme Court 
decision. 145 It does require a determination by individual directors that 
there is a limit to the degree to which they should indulge the company's 
top executives; that charitable expenditures, like other expenditures that 
may be colored by self-interest, are an essential subject for the board's 
attention; and that-whether or not self-interest is found-oversight of the 
corporate charitable function is a valuable use of their limited time. 
143. As one commentator has pointed out, under existing law, virtually "any gift" 
to a bona fide charity can withstand the claims of shareholders that it represented 
corporate waste. See Shelby D. Green, Corporate Philanthropy and the Business Benefit: 
The Need for Clarity, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 239, 254 {1990). 
144. See generally, Lawrence E. Mitchell, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW xiii 
(1995) ("It is time that the corporation be recognized as what it is: a public institution 
with public obligations."). 
145. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (announcing new 
standards for boards of directors when approached with an acquisition offer). 
